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Europe and Constituent Powers: Ruptures with the Neoliberal Consensus? 
 
Maria Tzanakopoulou 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The financial crisis has precipitated constitutional transformations and institutional 
shifts of power equilibrium both within and beyond domestic borders. Within 
Member States of the EU, the strengthening of the executive power has almost 
become a leitmotif as the safeguarding of austerity under the pretence of necessity 
and at the expense of democracy informs parliamentary routine. At the same time, 
austerity measures imposed by the Union render domestic constitutional principles 
of social justice virtually void of content. Domestic judiciaries, favouring as they do 
an economic-oriented reading of constitutional provisions and endorsing precarious 
interpretations of the ‘national interest’ in light of the need to shield the economy 
against the crisis, align themselves with dominant internal and external political 
imperatives. A parallel shift away from socio-economic welfare in Member States’ 
political agendas can be read as both a trigger and a consequence of the institutional 
mutations. For all their importance, the above developments tell us only one part of 
the constitutional story of the crisis. Of no less constitutional relevance is the actual 
embedment of austerity in societies: the perception of austerity as necessary or, 
worse even, as normal. This embedment, which has long been encoded in the very 
gene of the Union, safeguards the dominance of austerity and neoliberalism to the 
same extent as does, for example, the introduction of budgetary constraints in 
domestic constitutional documents. It is therefore important that constitutional 
discourse does not limit itself to a defence of pre-crisis constitutional business as 
usual but rather expands to a wholesale challenge of the structures, logic, and 
rationale behind the crisis and austerity. To that effect, one needs to examine the 
constitutional tendencies, structural or not, of the EU, as much as those of the 
Union’s individual Member States. 
 
Keywords: constitutionalism; austerity; constituent power; European Union; state 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The European project has perhaps never been more thoroughly disputed across the 
whole range of the political spectrum, than it is today. From the far left to the far 
right, the ongoing crisis is precipitating robust reactions, sometimes caught up in 
extremist and xenophobic rhetoric and at other times motivated by progressive 
egalitarian demands. This analysis explores the constitutional relevance of the above 
developments with a special focus on the constitutional facets of the main outcome 
of the crisis, austerity, and the response given by European societies.    
 
  
Constitutional discourse on the European crisis often tends to emphasise the 
constitutional mutations and institutional shifts of power equilibrium within both the 
Union and its individual Member States. Within Member States, the strengthening of 
the executive power has almost become a leitmotif as the safeguarding of austerity 
under the pretence of necessity and at the expense of democracy informs 
parliamentary routine. At the same time, externally imposed austerity measures 
render domestic constitutional principles of social justice virtually void of content. 
The judiciary, favouring as it does an economic-oriented reading of constitutional 
provisions and endorsing precarious interpretations of the ‘national interest’ in light 
of the need to shield the economy, aligns itself with dominant internal and external 
political imperatives. A parallel shift away from socio-economic welfare in Member 
States’ political agendas can be read as both a trigger and a consequence of the 
institutional mutations. The above constitutional and institutional developments are 
frequently laid at the door of the European Union; an entity sometimes accused of 
being institutionally impotent to re-build democracy and welfare and sometimes 
charged with structural neoliberal bias. According to both of the above views, but 
notably according to the latter, the European project is almost hopeless. 
 
For all its importance, the above discourse, which largely emphasises the 
institutional dimensions of recent developments tells us only one part of the 
constitutional story of the European crisis. Of no less constitutional relevance is the 
actual embedment of austerity in societies: the perception of austerity as necessary 
or, worse even, as normal. The following analysis argues that this embedment 
safeguards the dominance of austerity to the same extent as does, for example, the 
EU-driven introduction of budgetary constraints in domestic constitutional 
documents. It is therefore important that constitutional discourse does not limit 
itself to a defence of pre-crisis, allegedly sovereign, constitutional business as usual 
but rather expands to a wholesale challenge of the logic and rationale behind the 
crisis, neoliberalism and austerity.  
 
This entails the need to point the finger at those responsible for the present 
precarious situation. The following analysis argues that while the Union, represented 
by its political and economic elite, bears considerable responsibility, liability lies 
primarily with domestic political actors and economic elites. In this sense, it is argued 
that, whether structural or not, the problems facing the European Union need to be 
attacked at both domestic and regional levels. However, the poor constitutional 
quality of the Union renders the latter possibility practically unattainable. 
 
In section I, the analysis reviews and reframes constitutional discourse by placing at 
the heart of constitutionalism, broadly understood, the effort to secure social 
consensus with a view to maintaining the status quo. This reading of 
constitutionalism also invites an understanding of constitutional arrangements as 
predominantly national arrangements. According to this reading, a broad national 
consensus around austerity suffices to render it constitutional. This is so, irrespective 
of whether austerity measures have been entrenched in the constitutional 
document, and regardless of potentially anti-democratic practices on the part of 
governors. As the violence of austerity policies deepens, notably in the Southern 
  
parts of the European region, the hitherto strong consensus around austerity shows 
signs of disintegration. Drawing on these challenges against the logic of austerity, 
section II encourages an understanding of constituent power as a living 
emancipatory body that can counterbalance the constitutional transformations by 
building strong social structures and adding agonistic forms of democracy in to the 
constitutional equation. In the final analysis, it is concluded that, if the new 
consensus challenges the neoliberal logic of austerity, constitutionalism will have to 
embrace it. And while such constitutional challenge might fall on deaf ears in the 
quarters of the ECB and Commission, as it has done in the past, one can never be 
entirely confident that this will be the case indefinitely.  
 
 
I. The Constitution, the Crisis and Austerity: Re-framing the Discourse 
 
 
At the outset, the relation between the European crisis and domestic constitutions 
appears to be anything but a dialectical one: the main byproducts of the crisis, 
budgetary discipline and increased austerity, seem to threaten the integrity of 
national constitutional arrangements while domestic constitutions seems completely 
unfit to curtail the violent forces of austerity politics. There is much talk about the 
constitutional mutations brought about by - notably externally imposed - austerity 
measures on EU Member States. The discourse often takes the form of description 
of substantive changes in the constitutional rules of Member States, with a view to 
proving the mutating effect of the politics behind the crisis on the long-established 
welfarist constitutional consensus in the region.1 Within this context, constitutional 
rules are understood as the basic and relatively rigid set of checks and balances 
prescribing the main principles of organisation of a polity. In light of this reading, the 
argument is often that chaining the neoliberal economic model in the hard and fast 
rules of the constitution removes this model from the realm of politics and from 
democratic confrontation.2 This is sometimes seen as a systemic failure of the 
Union;3 a failure that was bound to result in disintegration once the strong-arm 
tactics of blocking democratic conflict were felt within European societies. At other 
times, it is viewed with less hostility, as simply marking a shift from the political to 
the legal constitution. In this latter case, the proposed remedy is to re-introduce the 
basics of democratic politics within budgetary decision-making through, for example, 
procedural constitutional changes within a broader context of deliberative 
constitutionalism.4  
                                                 
1 See, eg, M Adams, F Fabbrini and P Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary 
Constraints (Hart Publishing 2014) pt II, 151-296.  
2 See, eg, G Delledonne, ‘A Legalization of Financial Constitutions in the EU? Reflections on 
the German, Spanish, Italian and French experiences’ in M Adams, F Fabbrini and P Larouche (eds), 
Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Hart Publishing 2014) 181-204. 
3 See, eg, E Chiti and PG  Teixeira, ‘The Constitutional Implications of the European Responses to the 
Financial and Public Debt Crisis’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 683. 
4 For example, the argument sometimes is that ‘[procedural] constitutional change through scrutiny 
by fiscal councils may avoid’ the problem of decision-making behind closed doors and through secret 
letters by, say, the ECB. ‘The more discursive nature of such constitutional reform can create 
  
 
More specifically, much of the literature criticises the Union mechanisms for their 
failure to be effective and/or legitimate. According to this reading, the institutional 
machinery of the EU and EMU, as well as the constitutional framework of the Union, 
proved insufficient to withstand the pressures and institutional transformations 
brought about by the financial crisis.5 The democratic deficit deepens, so the 
argument goes, because intergovernmentalism, enabled by the Lisbon Treaty, 
replaces the weak institutional apparatus of the Union, and fails to produce effective 
and legitimate results.6 Proposed remedies range from the need to re-establish 
mutual trust between the EU and its citizens, to a call for abandonment of idealistic 
appeals to solidarity and for recourse to the constitutional responsibility of burden-
sharing within the EMU.7   
 
The discourse has taken a slightly different turn in light of Brexit referendum results. 
As it happens in times of major political change, polarisation fuelled more radical 
approaches. Constitutional critics have blogged, in a cry of despair, that the Union is 
not merely unable to withstand pressures. Instead, it is EU structures themselves 
that breed and perpetuate the crisis: ‘EU Treaties not only contain procedural 
protections for capitalism, (…): they also entrench substantive policies which 
correspond to the basic tenets of neoliberalism.’8 Thus, according to which stance 
one takes towards the structural matter, proposed solutions range from more or less 
marginal institutional amendments to getting rid altogether of an entity structurally 
doomed to fail.  
 
Alongside the above attack against the Union’s structural flaws or mere impotence 
to carry out either input or output legitimacy, the literature also focuses upon the 
constitutional significance of the relevant developments for national constitutions. 
Valuable comparative research has been conducted on the (in)ability of domestic 
constitutional structures to absorb and effectively contain the Fiscal Compact’s 
                                                                                                                                           
opportunities for correction of errors, and most importantly for debate and a plurality of sources of 
information.’ See T Prosser, ‘Constitutionalising Austerity in Europe’ [2016] Public Law 111, 129. 
5 Many attribute this failure to the construction of the European Economic Constitution on the 
example of the German Ordo-liberal model and the inflexibility of its rules. See, notably, C Joerges, 
‘The European Economic Constitution and Its Transformation Through the Financial Crisis’ (2015) 
ZenTra Working Paper in Transnational Studies No. 47/2015 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2560245>. 
6 See, eg, S Fabrinni, ‘Intergovernmentalism and its Limits: Assessing the European Union’s Answer to 
the Euro crisis’ (2013) 46 Comparative Political Studies 1003. 
7 On trust, see, eg, M Poiares Maduro, ‘Foreword: Fiscal Capacity and Constitutional Reform in the 
EMU’ in M Adams, F Fabbrini and P Larouche (eds), Constitutionalization of European Budgetary 
Constraints (Hart Publishing 2014) v-xiv; P Craig, ‘Economic Governance and the Euro crisis: 
Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional Implications’ in M Adams, F Fabbrini and P Larouche 
(eds), Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraint (Hart Publishing 2014) 19-40; On 
burden-sharing, see P Lindseth, ‘Power and Legitimacy in the Eurozone: Can Integration and 
Democracy be Reconciled?’ in M Adams, F Fabbrini and P Larouche (eds), Constitutionalization of 
European Budgetary Constraints (Hart Publishing 2014) 379-398. 
8 D Nicol, ‘Is Another Europe Possible?’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 29 February 2016) 
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/>. 
  
distinctly German ‘balance budget rule’:9 not every Member State is ready to speak 
the language of the German constitutional legislator.10 The result is, inter alia, that 
the CJEU, which is now able to supervise the budgetary discipline of Member States, 
may have to dig deep into domestic constitutional systems that are unable to come 
up to the requirements for constitutional amendments tailored to the German 
constitutional model. It thus seems that even when the focus is on domestic 
arrangements, the blame bounces back to the EU and its structural fixation on a 
‘Germanness’ often regarded as the main actor responsible for the crisis of the 
European project.11 
 
In terms of purely internal constitutional arrangements, the relevance of the crisis 
reaches far beyond the need to incorporate fiscal constraints into hierarchically 
superior constitutional provisions. Of no less importance is the circumvention of 
already existing constitutional checks and balances, notably in those countries that 
have implemented the most harsh austerity measures, mainly in response to 
conditionality demands imposed, inter alia, by the Union. The Portuguese and Greek 
stories that have developed in parallel are indicative of this. In Portugal, the 
government under Prime Minister Coelho, formed in 2011, defended the 2013 state 
budget, when the latter was challenged before the Constitutional Court, by making a 
plea to the country’s state of emergency.12 Worse still, in Greece ‘acts of legislative 
content’, supposed to be reserved for ‘extraordinary circumstances of an urgent and 
unforeseeable need’, have become a routine way of passing legislation 
implementing externally imposed austerity measures. 13  National Constitutional 
Courts tend, as they do in times of crises, to defer considerably to the domestic 
legislator, especially as regards the latter’s initiatives related to compliance with EU 
or other international obligations.14   
 
                                                 
9 Article 3(2) of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union (TSCG); For a review of the methods of constitutionalisation of EU countries see, Adams and 
others (n 1) Pt II; Prosser (n 9).  
10 L Besselink and JH Reestman, ‘The Fiscal Compact and the European Constitutions: ‘Europe 
Speaking German’ (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review 1. 
11 See M Everson, ‘An Ideal, Not a Place: A Euro-Critic’s Case for the UK Remaining in the EU’ 
(VerfBlog, 11 June 2016) <http://verfassungsblog.de/an-ideal-not-a-place-a-euro-critics-case-for-the-
uk-remaining-in-the-eu/>.  
12 ‘Press Review: PM Invokes “National Emergency” to Defend State Budget in High Court‘ Portugal 
Daily News (8 January 2013) <www.portugaldailyview.com/whats-new/press-review-prime-minister-
calls-revision-of-state-budget-national-emergency> The review notes: ‘Prime Minister Passos Coelho 
is using the argument of “national emergency” to defend the coalition government’s 2013 state 
budget after it was sent by the president and all opposition parties to be reviewed by the 
Constitutional Court’.   
13 See Article 44 Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Greece, as revised by the parliamentary resolution 
of May 27th 2008 of the VIII Revisionary Parliament. 
14 In this context, many note the exception of the Portuguese Constitutional Court. See, eg, 
M  Canotilho and others, ‘Austerity Measures Under 
Judicial Scrutiny: The Portuguese Constitutional Case-Law’ (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law 
Review 155; For a comparative account of relevant case law, see C Fasone, ‘Constitutional Courts 
Facing the Euro Crisis: Italy, Portugal and Spain in a Comparative Perspective’ (2014) EUI Working 
Papers (MWP 2014/15) 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33859/MWP_WP_2014_25.pdf>. 
  
The constitutional discourse, as summarised above, tells a tale of two possible 
routes.  One is to effectuate procedural change in the Union’s institutional 
machinery. Such proposals may be essential, inasmuch as they highlight realistic 
amendments within the warp and weft of institutional arrangements in neoliberal 
political orders. The other route is to do away with the Union lock, stock, and barrel. 
This could be an equally valuable proposal to the extent that the Union suffers from 
systemic failures at the constitutional level, which block any possibility for genuine 
radical change, a change much needed for increasing sections of the population that 
suffer most severely from austerity politics. Yet, as will be explained below, both 
approaches, while offering necessary insights, seem inadequate in getting to the 
root of the constitutional significance of the crisis.  
 
In particular, constitutional discourse appears to be dominated by three tendencies, 
which offer a narrow perspective of the constitutional setting of both the Union and 
its Member States. First, procedural accounts seem to be driven by a bureaucratic-
oriented or instrumentalist reasoning.15 It is assumed that an adjustment of the 
constitutional and institutional machinery of the EU or of the Member States will 
improve, or even suffice to rectify, both European and domestic constitutional 
missteps. Secondly, a sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit conclusion of the 
above discourse is that ‘globalisation in its regional variety of Europeanisation marks 
the end not only of the political Westphalian paradigm but, in its wake, the 
economic Keynesian paradigm as well.’16 The end of Keynesianism is at other times 
attributed to the untrustworthiness of the EU’s institutional framework, which has 
forced Member States ‘to push forward austerity measures as a precondition for 
financial support’.17 Here, the focus shifts away from the nation state. Instead, the 
main responsibility for the constitutional mutations, evident in the shift away from 
welfarism and towards austerity, is rediscovered in either the systemic institutional 
failure of the EU or, more broadly, in the forces of globalisation. Thirdly, there is an 
emphasis on the obligation of national courts to guard the constitution or, even, to 
become agents of political stability. This approach tends to disregard the fact that 
austerity policies usually go hand in hand with emergency situations in times of 
crises, namely with what has been termed ‘mega-politics’: ‘core political 
controversies that define (and often divide) whole polities.’18 In cases such as these, 
as Tushnet points out, albeit in a different context, ‘the constitutional law of 
emergency powers is (primarily) political rather than legal.’19  
 
                                                 
15 For a non-instrumentalist, socio-legal perspective, see K Nicolaides, ‘European Democracy and its 
Crisis’ (2013) 51 Journal of Common Market Studies 351. 
16  L Besselink and JH Reestman, ‘The Fiscal Compact and the European Constitutions: ‘Europe 
Speaking German’’ (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review 6. 
17 See M Adams, F Fabbrini and P  Larouche, ‘Introduction: The Constitutionalization of European 
Budgetary Constraints: Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Comparative Perspective’, Adams, Fabbrini 
and Larouche (eds), Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints, 4. 
18 R Hirschl, ‘The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide’ (2006) 75 
Fordham Law Review 721, 727. 
19 M Tushnet, ‘The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Lessons From Hamdan’ (2007) 
91 Minnesota Law Review 1451, 1452. 
  
For one, codified constitutions usually tend to express some inclination, whether 
explicit or de facto, towards a particular economic system. Nevertheless, as critics 
correctly point out, the Fiscal Compact’s requirement for constitutionalisation of 
budgetary restrictions and fiscal constraints takes the neoliberal bias of European 
constitutions to unprecedented levels.20 It is therefore both significant and necessary 
to explore the constitutional and institutional mechanics of implementation of 
austerity measures, as it is significant to examine the systemic depth of the problem. 
However, there is one element of constitutional significance that none of the above 
three tendencies touch upon – perhaps understandably so, given their different 
focus.  
 
Next to the technical constitutional difficulties faced by the Union and its Member 
States, there is, domestically, a parallel construction of a discursive field that 
presents the choice for austerity policies as mirroring a state of exception. Within 
this context, domestic elites seek to legitimise austerity under the pretence that 
there is no alternative.21 At this juncture, one has to pause and, first, re-evaluate the 
primacy (or not) of the nation state vis-à-vis the shift away from welfarism. Is 
austerity truly an externally imposed duty that Member States are coerced into 
implementing? Or is it, rather, a choice of Member States themselves? Secondly, in 
terms of the constitutional entrenchment and, therefore, de-politicisation of a 
particular economic model, one has to reflect upon what it is that differentiates the 
‘no alternative’ narrative from the actual introduction of fiscal constraints or 
substantive neoliberal policies in constitutional documents. Once the ‘no alternative’ 
narrative is embedded in societies and treated as an irrefutable truth, the 
constitutional entrenchment of austerity offers no more and no less than a formal, if 
not merely symbolic, testimony of what has already occurred at a social level. Seen 
in this way, the constitutional significance of austerity is at least as much a matter of 
political discourse as it is of constitutional doctrine. Accordingly, even if one accepts 
the systemic nature of the crisis and the unavoidability of the changes precipitated 
by it, one must also accept that there is more to the constitutional story than simply 
the question of structure. What seems to be lacking in the constitutional discourse 
on austerity is an actual challenge to the underlying rationale of austerity itself and, 
concomitantly, an effort to infiltrate such a challenge into a constitutional narrative. 
Critically, this requires a shift away from thinking about the crisis in terms of 
European and domestic constitutional rules and a redirection of focus towards what 
is a broader concept, namely constitutionalism. The latter, as understood in this 
analysis, retains its relative autonomy from constitutional rules and is instead 
conceived as a project, which being permeated by the force of ideology, secures 
social consensus by acting out social conflict. Unlike analyses that focus on 
constitutional rules, the concept of constitutionalism offers the advantage of adding 
                                                 
20 M Sah and T Daintith, ‘Privatisation and the Economic Neutrality of the Constitution’ [1993] Public 
Law 465. 
21 See, for an analysis of the discursive framework, P Fonseca and MJ Ferreira, ‘Through “Seas Never 
Before Sailed”: Portuguese Government Discursive Legitimation Strategies in a Context of Financial 
Crisis’ (2015) 26 Discourse & Society 682; On the use of the ‘no alternative’ rhetoric by MSs as an 
excuse to implement labour law reforms see, S Clauwaert and I Schömann, ‘The Crisis and National 
Labour Reforms’ (2012) 3 European Labour Law Journal 54.  
  
an extra element into the discourse, namely social relations. In the following 
sections, I explore the idea of constitutionalism and explain the importance of 
introducing the element of social relations within constitutional narratives of the 
crisis and of austerity. 
 
A. Recasting Constitutionalism 
 
Constitutionalism has been used so extensively and divergently that it has become 
associated with virtually everything, from the empowerment of citizens and 
democracy22 to the depoliticisation of politics at national and transnational level,23 
and from the universal triumph of liberalism and the rule of law24 to the alleged 
demise, or ‘total crisis’, of the nation state.25 Constitutionalism has almost become a 
hackneyed concept; a concept the content of which appears to have been 
progressively frittered away. It is therefore not easy to give an account of 
constitutionalism without becoming caught up in the whirl of truisms and/or 
contradictions that accompany the concept. In fact, the following account does not 
claim to distance itself from any of the clichés of constitutional thinking. It merely 
seeks to frame constitutionalism in a way that is consistent with the latter’s raison 
d'être.  
 
In what would be a typical definition of constitutionalism, the latter would be 
presented, in the main, as prescribing the idea of specified political authority and of 
limited government.26 Constitutionalism is about the marking off of the limits of 
public power and the removal from the latter’s reach of ‘certain favoured private 
activities.’27 Constitutions reflect the will of people in their sovereign capacity and it 
is precisely for this reason that they can limit and control government.28 According 
to this reading, constitutionalism marks the transition from the feudal society’s 
irrational imposition of authority to adherence to the rule of law, checked, balanced, 
and constrained state power, as well as to the guarantee of a minimum amount of 
personal autonomy for the people. It should follow that, when the constitution is no 
more capable of constraining state power, because the latter no longer resides in the 
state, then constitutionalism ceases to fulfil its purpose and must perhaps be 
revamped at supranational level. 
 
                                                 
22 U Preuss, ‘The Political Meaning of Constitutionalism’ in R Bellamy (ed), Constitutionalism, 
Democracy and Sovereignty (Ashgate Publishing 1996), 12. 
23 J Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake (Routledge 1975) 76. 
24 See, eg, L Diamond and M Plattner, ‘Introduction’ in L Diamond and M Plattner  (eds), The Global 
Divergence of Democracies (John Hopkins University Press 2001) xxi. 
25 L Ferrajoli, ‘Beyond sovereignty and citizenship: A Global Constitutionalism’ in Bellamy (ed), 
Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Avebury 1996) 
151. 
26 G Schochet, ‘Introduction’ in R Pennock and J Chapman (eds), Nomos XX: Constitutionalism (New 
York University Press 1979) 10. 
27 R Kay, ‘American Constitutionalism’ in L Alexander (ed), Constitutionalism (Cambridge University 
Press 1998) 22. 
28 See C Fritz, ‘Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early 
American Constitutional Debate’ (1997) 24 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 287. 
  
A slightly different reading would approach constitutionalism not merely as a 
response to the need for setting constrains to state power, but rather, primarily, in 
tandem with capitalism and the related demand to secure the peaceful co-existence 
of citizens and the smooth operation of national markets. Once constitutionalism is 
approached in this way, the weight of its purposes shifts from adherence to the rule 
of law to the need to create social consensus. Seen in this light, constitutionalism, 
seeking as it does to appease social conflict and to secure consensus, demarcates the 
legal framework within which this conflict materialises. Citizens are granted rights 
and freedoms in exchange for their harmonious coexistence in the face of social 
inequality. Constitutionalism can therefore be approached more as a political 
instrument that assists in the maintenance of the status quo and less as a legal tool 
that establishes the rule of law. It is in this sense that constitutionalism retains a 
relative autonomy from the constitution. While the latter is a strong indicator of the 
quality and resilience of social consensus, it cannot always be relied upon as a 
measuring device of the status of social relations within a polity. This is so, not least 
because it is the very point of the constitution to be subject to divergent 
interpretations following, at best, the changing socio-economic and political climate 
but, at worst, the political project of any given political elite. 
 
On the above account, it can be inferred that constitutionalism acknowledges the 
omnipresent existence of conflicting social interests, regardless of whether such 
conflict is conscious or not. This acknowledgment is, in and of itself, important. It is 
important, first, because it bespeaks an unbreakable link between constitutionalism 
and the nation state. The resolution of conflicting social interests cannot easily be 
attempted, let alone achieved, at extra-state level.29 The German worker does not, 
and will not in the foreseeable future, be on the same wavelength or identify their 
interests, with the Romanian or Spanish one. This is only understandable. Different 
states, regardless of whether they belong to the EU/EMU or not, have different 
characteristics: insurance policies, taxation systems, employment relations, social 
rights, and the institutions that protect them, prices and governmental budgets, 
wages and, in general, the factors that determine how profit is made, are not 
homogenous in the different Member States of the Union. The structure and content 
of the above institutions reflect different national histories. Certainly, they also 
reflect different outcomes of the social struggles, and the balance of powers that 
emerged therefrom, within each national formation. Finally, they determine the 
scope and size of social conflict, the dimensions of which are therefore dissimilar 
within the Union’s various Member States. This means that, if constitutionalism is 
seen primarily as a tool that acts out social conflict, its purpose cannot easily be 
fulfilled unless constitutionalism is located in the nation state.  
 
The acknowledgment on the part of constitutional arrangements of the ubiquitous 
existence of social conflict is important, secondly, because it indicates that, without a 
                                                 
29 Even strands of the literature that support the internationalisation of the state and of collective 
social forces are hesitant to admit that anything akin to democratic conflict resolution is occurring at 
the global level: See, eg, A Demirovic,  ‘NGOs, the State, and Civil Society: The Transformation of 
Hegemony’ (2003) 15 Rethinking Marxism 213; S Gill, ‘New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and 
Global Political Economy (1998) 10 Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change 23. 
  
minimum legal recognition of conflicting social interests, social coexistence is non-
viable. One might then wonder how constitutionalism achieves consensus so 
effectively, given the pervasive quality of social conflict. The answer is to be found in 
the notion of constitutionalism as ideology, in particular the ideology of the united 
and undivided nation, a nation with common interests and characteristics. The 
demarcation of the inside from the outside is vital for constitutionalism as it 
minimises the outward show of social antagonisms and the potential for eruption of 
violent conflict uncontainable by law.30 The national interest is the idea upon which 
the state builds its unity and emerges as the representative of its people.  
 
It is on the basis of the above understanding of constitutionalism that the present 
analysis sees the political offspring of the crisis, austerity, as a matter of 
constitutional importance. This is so, not so much because of the entrenchment of 
fiscal constraints in constitutional documents, but rather because of the attempt at 
legitimation of austerity in political discourse and practice through the rhetoric of 
austerity as national interest.31 When austerity becomes legitimised and therefore 
unchallengeable in the social body; when, in other words, austerity becomes part of 
the social consensus, it has already become constitutionally anchored.  
 
Before closing this section, two remarks need to be made. First, we need to accept 
that the effort to justify and endorse austerity could never succeed were it to be 
undertaken by the Union alone. This endeavour has to be filtered through the 
national institutions. The maxim of austerity as national interest, if it is to be at all 
persuasive, must be expressed by state representatives acting in the name of this 
interest. It is therefore indispensable to reevaluate the extent to which the political 
project of austerity challenges sovereign state powers. In particular, it is significant 
to reflect upon the question of primacy in this bundle of political developments. 
National authorities are no less busy trying to prove that austerity is unavoidable 
than are, for example, the European Central Bank or the Commission. Without 
rejecting the major influence of external actors in national austerity tactics, the role 
of the nation state has to be reappraised. In fact, the role of the nation state has to 
be recognised as predominant, not least in terms of legitimation of austerity in the 
nation’s collective unconscious.  
 
At the same time, it is difficult - indeed, it would be inaccurate - to claim that the 
Union plays a minimal role in the breakthrough of austerity in EU Member States. 
Legitimating a political project in the eyes of the masses would be devoid of any 
tangible effects without this project’s actual political and legal institutionalisation. 
Here the Union emerges as a catalyst for the surfacing of a debased form of 
European constitutionalism, which seeks to create pan-European consensus around 
                                                 
30 See, eg, D Grimm, ‘The Achievements of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World’ in 
M Loughlin and P Dobner (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford University Press 2012) 12. 
31 It is indicative, for example, that one of the countries most severely hit by austerity, Greece, has not 
proceeded to any constitutional amendment in order to include budgetary constraints within the 
constitutional document. Note that the relevant rhetoric reaches beyond the Eurozone. For an 
account of austerity-as-national-interest in the UK, see N Ritchie, ‘Whose National Interest?’ in T 
Edmunds and others (eds), British Foreign Policy and the National Interest: Identity, Strategy and 
Security (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 91. 
  
the institutionalisation of austerity without acknowledging conflict. The result of this 
peculiar process of European constitutionalisation is the coming together of 
European elites and the knocking down of any possibility for pan-European struggles 
at the level of European societies. The latter increasingly tend to conceive conflict as 
a battle of nation versus nation. Enter Brexit. 
 
The largely nationalistic and xenophobic discourse that has surrounded and driven 
the Brexit vote brings me to my second point. While the source of austerity, 
neoliberalism, is now deeply embedded at the social level of Member States and has 
informed the ways in which we understand our role in the world and our relations 
with our fellow citizens, the recent violent outbreak of austerity is not equally well 
received in societies.32 As already remarked, at pan-European level this challenge 
more often than not tends to take the form of fearmongering about the European 
‘other’. At Member State level, there is an apparent inefficacy of even the all-
powerful idea of the national interest to fully absorb the enormous austerity-driven 
dissonance between different national social fractions. Crucially, this is the case 
regardless of whether budgetary and fiscal constraints have taken the form of 
constitutional provisions, and notwithstanding Constitutional Courts’ proclamations 
that austerity and the national interest go hand in hand.33 And, one might add, this 
will remain the case, whatever improvements, marginal or not, are made to the 
institutional framework of the EU and/or the Member States, as long as austerity 
remains the determinant factor of the organisation of societies. Herein lies an 
indication that the ‘political’ cannot always be contained by the ‘legal’.  
 
Most importantly, however, it becomes evident that, if constitutionalism is about 
the acting out of social conflict, then austerity has not been constitutionalised in a 
successful manner. In fact, far from securing social consensus and the maintenance 
of the status quo, austerity, despite the attempts at constitutionalising it, seems to 
have achieved precisely the opposite: an upswing in extreme rightwing ideology and 
activity on the one hand and a surge in public support for political powers that 
challenge the established order of things on the other. Coupled with the second 
tendency is an increase in social solidarity movements, notably in the states whose 
citizens are suffering the most. This situation brings Europe before an impasse that 
might always have existed, but which has come into view more strikingly than ever 
with the outbreak of the crisis, with both of the above tendencies undermining the 
                                                 
32 On the dominance and embedment of (neoliberal) ideology, see L Althusser, On The Reproduction 
Of Capitalism: Ideology And Ideological State Apparatuses (GM Goshgarian tr, Verso, 2014); M 
Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972–1977 (C Gordon ed, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf 1980) 119; A Gramsci, Prison Notebooks Volume III (JA Buttigieg tr, Columbia 
University Press 1975) 171. I say ‘recent outbreak’, because austerity is not a new phenomenon. 
However, it is only in its recent more intense form that it is being challenged to such an extent. On 
perceptions on austerity during the 1970s and the then powerful Italian Communist Party’s Enrico 
Berlinguer’s contentious reactions, see D Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West 
European Left in the Twentieth Century (Tauris 2010) 589-592. 
33 See, eg, Case 668/2012 (para 10) of the Council of State (Greece’s Supreme Administrative Court) 
on the constitutionality of the first Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Greek Government 
in 2010. 
 
  
foundations of the European project. The former, far right ideology and nationalistic 
rhetoric, drives a coach and horses through the ever closer Union of its people, the 
only truly emancipatory feature of the European endeavour. The latter tendency, 
social movements, debunks the basis of the neoliberal European economic and 
political project, as expressed and realised by the austerity agenda of national 
governments. 
 
As the weak, one-sided European constitutionalism seems unfit or unwilling to 
curtail nationalistic tendencies and to enable a pan-European struggle that would 
allow European social fractions to come together and make possible the re-
imagining of a European idea, we are possibly left with one alternative: filtering 
political action and disobedience through national constitutionalism. Before I 
explore how constitutionalism can play an active and, this time, progressive role in 
the above state of affairs, it is important to explain austerity not merely in terms of 
budgetary constraints, limitations to sovereign decision-making, and technical 
details, but rather in terms of its effects on the social body. 
 
B. A Note on Austerity-Knitting Austerity and Constitutionalism 
 
The endeavour to legitimise austerity is largely connected with the rhetoric of 
necessity. Austerity appears necessary because it will guarantee a state’s economic 
survival; because it will ensure the smooth functioning of the economic system and 
hinder a bailout; because it will secure a state’s participation in the EU and/or EMU; 
because it will save the common currency; because, finally, it is a condition for 
external economic assistance. This rhetoric, revolving as it does around necessity, is 
reminiscent of the state of exception. Such state, says Agamben, tends to become 
the dominant political paradigm in the largest part of the Western world, for reasons 
ranging from the need to respond to financial crises to the need to return to 
conditions of political normality.34 It is so much so, that the state of emergency tends 
to become normality in itself. Austerity thus emerges as a quasi-state of exception, 
which, instead of suspending the constitution, is aspiring to become a constitutional 
norm itself. 
 
Be that as it may, once austerity is seen in broader terms than simple economic or 
legal technicalities, the disruption of social cohesion becomes almost self-evident. 
Austerity might bring with it the violent repression of any expression of opposition, 
but the story does not end there. As austerity deepens and jeopardises survival, its 
persuasive potential deteriorates. It is then possible that austerity becomes 
accompanied by recourse to threats, intimidation, and moral dilemmas, which build 
up an impression of spread out war and which reconstruct society as a force 
disseminated by precisely this sense: of spread out war.35  
 
                                                 
34 G Agamben, State of Exception (K Attell tr, University of Chicago Press 2005) 1-31. 
35 M Markantonatou,  ‘The State of Financial Crisis and the Rhetoric of Emergency, Economic War and 
Downfall of Sovereignty’ (2012) 118 Theseis. Available at: 
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Here, positive constitutional provisions play a diminished role, if any role at all. 
Instead, what seems to prevail is the penetration of authoritarian and militarist 
elements within the very structure of the state. If one now looks at the European 
history of the last century one will find out that such penetration in liberal regimes 
has constituted the necessary condition for the ultimate dominance of fascism.36 
This does not merely explain the upsurge of extreme right and nationalist forces 
throughout Europe. It is also a reminder that the constitutional relevance of 
austerity is not limited to its constitutional entrenchment. We must, therefore, 
construct a constitutional narrative capable of absorbing the eminent dangers 
inherent in the modern politics of austerity. This narrative must pertain both to the 
Union, as the primary driver of austerity politics, and to its Member States, as the 
zealous enablers and facilitators of this political project. That said, the Union does 
not easily fit within a constitutional narrative that seeks to have an emancipatory 
dimension. This will be discussed in what follows. 
 
II.  Reclaiming Constituent Power 
 
It was argued above that constitutionalism is a legal and political instrument that 
facilitates the maintenance and longevity of established political arrangements, ergo 
of the status quo. To this end, constitutionalism seeks to achieve consensus. One 
therefore needs to explore the prerequisites for consensus and conditions of its 
maintenance. Aristotle, for example, a robust advocate of respect for the law and of 
political stability, taught that active disobedience was essential when it was driven 
by the need to preserve harmony.37 For Machiavelli, enforced consensus would 
block out the antagonisms and dissent in society and, by preventing the creation of 
mobilised social forces able to further democracy, would result in bloodshed.38 The 
same underlying idea appears to have been relied upon by many constitutional 
scholars who, in their study of the constitutional dimensions of austerity, have 
argued that constitutional entrenchment of budgetary constraints will prevent 
economic policies from being negotiated in the political arena.39 This reading of post-
crisis developments is largely correct.  It does, however, seem to imply that 
constitutional crystallisation of a policy suffices to render that policy inalienable. 
Here, the constitution is equated with constitutionalism. However, the two need to 
be distinguished because the former is a document while the latter can be 
understood as a project comprising not solely the rules enshrined in the document 
but rather a whole range of social processes and dynamics capable of turning rules 
on their head.    
 
What does it mean for a policy to be negotiated in the political arena? And, crucially, 
who negotiates it? Herein lies the need to conceive constituent power, not as a 
                                                 
36 N Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism (Verso 
1979) 65-66. 
37 J Frank, ‘Aristotle on Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law’ (2006) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
37. 
38 N Machiavelli, History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy: From the Earliest Times to the Death of 
Lorenzo the Magnificent (The Pennsylvania State University Press 2007) 121; F Ankersmit, Aesthetic 
Politics: Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value (Stanford University Press 1996) 171-172. 
39 See the discussion of Pt II of this contribution. 
  
producer of constitutional norms who ceases to exist as soon as these norms are 
created, but rather as a living body that is ready to renegotiate constitutional 
certainties through democratic conflict. Surely, to reconcile such an understanding of 
constituent power with constitutionalism presents difficulties. Here is Antonio Negri: 
 
‘To acknowledge constituent power as a constitutional and juridical principle, we 
must see it not simply as producing constitutional norms and structuring constituted 
powers but primarily as a subject that regulates democratic politics. Yet this is not a 
simple matter. In fact, constituent power resists being constitutionalized: "Studying 
constituent power from the juridical perspective presents an exceptional difficulty 
given the hybrid nature of this power.... The strength hidden in constituent power 
refuses to be fully integrated in a hierarchical system of norms and competencies. 
Constituent power always remains alien to the law." The question becomes even 
more difficult because democracy, too, resists being constitutionalized: democracy is 
in fact a theory of absolute government, while constitutionalism is a theory of 
limited government and therefore a practice that limits democracy.’40 
 
Negri is right in claiming that ‘the political’ possesses a horizon not always able to be 
framed by what the constitutional order prescribes. He shows intellectual bravery in 
denying the constitutional, and therefore, according to his reading, also conservative 
quality of both the constituent power and of democracy: constituent power 
‘presents itself as the continual interruption of the constitutive rhythm and as 
revolutionary becoming with respect to political constructions and constituted 
being.’41 
 
Can we make Negri’s version of constituent power compatible with 
constitutionalism? I believe that we can. Constitutionalism, even in its version as an 
instrument directed towards protection of the status quo, leaves this possibility 
open. If we accept that the results of austerity policies reach further than mere 
economic and constitutional technicalities, into the very conditions of integrity of 
the social body; and if we further accept that constitutionalism is partly about 
preserving this integrity by allowing the acting out of conflict and the expression of 
dissent, then we have to detect within the constitutional arrangement a possibility 
for rupture in the established political order, when the latter is no longer viable. 
Such rupture will often be able to take the form of an eclectic challenge against all 
dominant logics that co-occur with post-crisis developments. In particular, it may be 
able to challenge established constitutional understandings of principles whose 
meaning has been determined by a distinctly neoliberal rationale. 
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The logics of self-determination as self-help and of freedom as a natural universal 
certainty, rather than as a demand fought for and won at the political level, are a 
case in point. Although one could not by a long shot claim that collective projects of 
social solidarity are becoming a dominant practice, some of the European states that 
are most severely hit by austerity offer examples of collective movements that 
progressively challenge dominant understandings of principles, which conceptually 
back the idea and practices of austerity.42 The Greek solidarity clinics test the 
neoliberal ideas of individualised risk, self-as-enterprise, and charitable activity by 
putting forward a philosophy of communal action and social solidarity in order to 
meet collective needs.43 Similarly, the Spanish indebted homeowners movement 
questions, in practice, dominant conceptions of individual property and of economic 
freedom as the only available understanding of liberty.44  
 
These are examples of how constituent power, understood, not as an undiversified 
multitude, but instead as collective social forces united under their common 
interests and needs, can produce cracks in the domestic constitutional order while 
remaining within its framework. Perhaps, we should be opting for a wholesale 
paradigm change. Perhaps, with Negri, we should demand that constituent power 
brings about the revolutionary conversion into what is beyond the vision of 
constituted being. But such conversion will occur neither instantly nor abruptly.  
 
Constitutionalism does have a role to play in the meantime. This role should not be 
limited to an instrumentalist defence of pre-crisis adherence to the constitutional 
letter. The letter of the constitution is never too clear and never too firm to 
guarantee success of such a claim, however right it might be. This role should even 
less be linked to a fixation with institutional and procedural changes that will make 
austerity policies more transparent while leaving them, in principle, unchallenged. 
The constitutional dimension of the crisis lies more in the embedment of austerity 
and its paraphernalia in societies, in its appearance as a normality or necessity. Let 
us therefore renegotiate what is normal and necessary both in theory and in 
practice. The constitution will embrace the outcome of this renegotiation - it cannot 
do otherwise.  
 
This process is difficult to replicate at European level. It is difficult, first, because the 
multi-tier system of states coexisting within the Union stands in the way of 
identification of common interests and of the building of pan-European movements 
from below. It is difficult, secondly, because the EU is immune from popular control. 
This is not so much a result of the (in)famous European democratic deficit and the 
lack of institutional transparency and accountability. It is rather a pragmatic 
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conclusion emanating from the fact that the Union seems to be untouchable by 
domestic contestation. 45  Whether structurally flawed or simply politically 
unscrupulous, the Union is nowhere near enabling the formation of a European 
constituent power able to challenge its neoliberal rationalities, normalities, and 
routines. Perhaps then the solution lies in spreading constructive opposition through 
the domestic route. Unlike the xenophobic and reactionary resistance that 
accompanied the largest part of the Brexit vote, such opposition can and has to be 
akin to a form of disobedience, defending rights and upholding the power of citizens 
to be involved in decisions that affect them. Another Europe might or might not be 
possible, but this is something that cannot be pre-empted. Lest we forget that 
structures, however difficult, are not impossible to shake. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The constitutional significance of austerity may well lie in the constitutional 
entrenchment of austerity rules in the constitutional document. Yet, the constitution 
can be seen in either technical terms, as the highest law of an entity or in broader 
terms, as the mode of organisation of social and political life. In the former case, the 
constitutionalisation of austerity refers to what the law prescribes. In the latter case, 
austerity insinuates itself in the social body emerging as the order of things, a 
routine or a normality. The preceding discussion argues that this latter form of 
constitutionalisation poses a far greater threat to societies. Interrupting embedded 
ideologies is always a process more tenuous than changing legal prescriptions. The 
threat has already materialised in Europe. Regardless of the degree to which 
different states have rendered austerity a constitutional command, austerity is 
constitutionalised. The European Union’s neoliberal fundamentalism has been 
conducive to this process. Whether structurally designed as a neoliberal order or, 
simply, driven to pursue the goal of austerity by its political leadership and its Court’s 
neoliberal agenda, the Union seems to always point to a predetermined winner in 
the battle between dominant and dominated social forces: the market. One 
response could be that, where winners are predetermined, there is no point in 
taking up arms. Another response could be to rethink of the European endeavour as 
one that could have never succeeded without the mediation of the state. The Union 
may be successful in imposing rules or conditionalities, but it is through the 
mechanisms of the state that these work their way into the level of dominant truths 
and hegemonic ideas. It may, therefore, be that Negri’s continual interruption of the 
constitutive rhythm of austerity should commence at state level. Besides, until we 
are able to discern anything akin to a genuine constituent power at EU level, the 
state may be the only constitutional order able to be disrupted. 
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